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ARGUMENTS 
I. APPORTIONMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES IS PROPER 
UNDER UTAH LAW AND IS ALREADY PERMISSIBLE IN THE 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT 
Ms. Edmonds argues in her brief that apportionment of medical expenses would 
not work in a case where no TTD or PPD payments were awarded. Specifically, Ms. 
Edmonds argues 
Here there wasn't any disability (not TTD or PPD) and only medical benefits are 
due ... If compensation under Section 110 were to mean medical benefits as well 
as disability benefits, then apportionment under this section would be impossible 
to apply when there is no disability or death, but only medical expenses, because 
the apportionment formula as worded specifically requires apportionment based 
upon a comparison of work and non-work related disability, making no mention of 
what medical care is related to the industrial injury or aggravation. (Appellee 
Brief, Page 9). 
Ms. Edmonds' reading of Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-110 is inconsistent when the 
benefits would be subject to causative apportionment, but the medical benefits would not 
be apportioned. Given this example, if TTD or PPD benefits were awarded they would 
be apportioned according to the 10% causative apportionment in this case, but medical 
benefits would be paid at 100% despite causative apportionment. This reading of the 
statute is inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature to only have the employer be 
responsible for their portion of the occupational disease caused by the employer. 
Otherwise, the employer is the general insurer of the petitioner's non-industrial 
conditions. 
To give meaning to the Legislature's directive with causative apportionment as 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 and spelled out in 34A-3-105, the applicable 
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statutes should be read to allow for apportionment of medical benefits. Otherwise, this 
Court's longstanding policy of avoiding coverage for conditions not caused or 
exacerbated by industrial factors would go by the wayside and the employer would be left 
paying for the employee's non-industrial medical expenses. 
In essence, Ms. Edmonds is arguing that she is entitled to have her Carpal Tunnel 
Syndrome covered 100% by her employer even though Ameritech was found to have 
contributed only 10% to her non-industrial conditions. Under Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court has ruled the employer should 
not be made to be the general insurer of an employees underlying, non-industrial 
conditions. If the Commission's decision holds true, this does not comply with the 
mandate laid out in Allen and shifts the burden of Ms. Edmonds' non-industrial 
conditions over to the employer. 
In order for consistent application of the causative apportionment principles found 
in § 110, causative apportionment must be applied to medical benefits along with other 
benefits received by Ms. Edmonds. The Legislature did not abandon the causative 
apportionment found in § 110 and § 105. Ms. Edmonds essentially argues that regardless 
of causative apportionment between industrial and non-industrial factors, medical 
benefits should be paid at 100% regardless of industrial exposure. This is inconsistent 
with the Industrial Accident Chapter, and inconsistent with the Occupational Disease 
Chapter's insistence of causative apportionment in §§ 105 and 110. 
As for Industrial Accidents, Utah Courts generally have recognized the nature of 
the traumatic injury that aggravates a non-industrial, pre-existing condition. Specifically, 
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in Giesbrecht v. Board of Review of State Indus. Comm'n, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), the Utah Court of Appeals provided the following: 
Utah law recognizes the aggravation rule such that where an industrial injury 
aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a preexisting condition, the entire 
resulting injury is compensable so long as the claimant can show that the 
employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in everyday life because of his condition. 
Giesbrecht 828 P.2d at 547 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
This is the long-standing rule in traumatic industrial injuries. Under this analysis 
for occupational disease claims, Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits would be wholly denied 
as she has failed in her burden of proof given Ameritech's 10% causative apportionment 
as found by the Commission. Ms. Edmonds would have had to show the employer's 
causative contribution exceeded 10% to show that it substantially increased the risk she 
already experienced in her day-to-day life given the 90% causative contribution attributed 
thereto. 
Given the differing nature of traumatic injuries versus long-standing occupational 
exposures, it is appropriate to apportion medical benefits based upon causative 
contribution. Otherwise, it would be inappropriate to require a substantial showing of 
causation to cover a non-industrial condition for traumatic injuries in Chapter 2, but then 
allow 100% coverage of medical benefits in the event the employer is found to have 
contributed even 1% towards the underlying condition. Apportionment of medical 
benefits would reconcile these inconsistencies or adopting a similar rule with respect to 
occupational diseases would reconcile the inconsistencies of Ms. Edmonds' position on 
appeal. 
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Because the Legislature enacted the Utah Occupational Disease Act with causative 
apportionment principles as the mode of recovery, this Court should allow causative 
apportionment to medical benefits. Otherwise, this Court would allow the burden-
shifting Ms. Edmonds seeks for her non-industrial conditions and would make the 
employer a general insurer of an employee's pre-existing condition. 
II. APPORTIONMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES WOULD NOT BE 
CONTRARY TO MS. EDMONDS' EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS 
The underlying argument for differing treatment under the equal protection law is 
the nature of the injuries. Without taking into account the nature of the injuries, Ms. 
Edmonds' arguments for equal protection ring hollow. Ms. Edmonds treats occupational 
exposures and traumatic injuries the same, despite the fact the nature of the injuries are 
different and require differing treatment. 
With a traumatic industrial injury, you have an identifiable accident or series of 
activities that lead to an injured back or other body part that is identifiable and concrete. 
From this you would be able to apportion between what is industrial and non-industrial 
under a series of tests under Allen to determine whether it was more likely than not, both 
legally and medically, that the injuries were caused by industrial factors. Given the 
nature of the traumatic injury, the Commission would also have to apply the exacerbation 
principles, as discussed in Giesbrecht to the injury to determine whether the employer 
was responsible for the intertwined pre-existing conditions and traumatic industrial 
injury. 
7 
With occupational diseases, there is a difference in the nature of the injury where 
the employee, as in this case, has numerous non-industrial factors that are causing the 
majority of the person's alleged disability. The question then changes from whether it 
was more likely than not that her injuries were related to industrial factors, to a question 
regarding the percentage of the injury caused by industrial factors. The problem arises 
out of the nature of the injury in general, where industrial factors and non-industrial 
factors are closely intertwined and must be determined on a percentage basis. Given the 
nature of the exposure, be it chemical or physical, there is such a difference as to allow 
for the disparate treatment between the two Chapters. 
In one example, because there is a back condition or a leg condition or some other 
condition where the courts have ruled that if the industrial factors ;lit up' the condition, 
the employer was responsible for the entirety of the injury and related benefits. In the 
occupational disease case, the difference is that industrial and non-industrial are 
intertwined to a degree that is not easily determined or separated and is separated on a 
percentage basis. 
As for a rational basis for allowing the treatments of two groups of injured 
workers to differ, the petitioner does not take into account the nature of the injuries and 
attempts to lump all injured parties into the same categories. The differences between the 
two groups are apparent when dealing with occupational exposures. 
An example is someone with asthma who is exposed to a chemical. The 
underlying condition is apparent, but there has been some exposure to the harmful 
chemical that has caused the condition to worsen, which would depend on the level of 
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exposure. The employee is tested and medical opinion provides that her condition has 
slightly worsened and so she is found to have a 65% pre-existing condition with only 
35% related to industrial factors. The only way to measure her industrial injury is 
through a percentage basis as she already had underlying conditions that had similar 
symptoms to her industrial exposure. 
This example is far different than an employee with degenerative disc disease in 
her low back and who suffers an injury to her back as a result of lifting a heavy object. If 
the employee had ruptured a disc in her low back there can be no percentage 
apportionment, except in permanent partial disability, because the injury is definable and 
definite. In recognition of this problem, Utah Courts have determined that if the accident 
iit up' or more than likely caused the condition to worsen, the underlying condition 
along with the industrial condition would be covered. 
Again, the nature of the injury mandates that if the underlying condition was 
exacerbated by industrial factors, there is no way to separate the injury to the body part 
and the employer is left to cover the industrially caused injury. As long as the industrial 
injury substantially caused the need for additional treatment or surgery, the non-industrial 
and industrial conditions are covered by the employer. 
In occupational disease cases, however, there must be a separation of underlying 
conditions and industrial conditions on a percentage basis because oftentimes one is 
looking at an exposure that is not easily definable. For instance, looking at the facts of 
the instant case, the medical panel and ALJ both determined that Ms. Edmonds' 
occupational exposure amounted to 10% of her overall problem. Her overall problem 
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had been defined as carpal tunnel syndrome caused by over-utilization of her hands in 
everyday life or for non-industrial activities was found to be 90% of the problem in her 
hands and wrists. This fact has not been appealed or challenged by Ms. Edmonds. 
The difference between the two examples is one of a long exposure that has been 
mixed with numerous non-industrial exposures, such as in the instant case, and a 
traumatic exposure that has turned a condition symptomatic. The differences between a 
long-term exposure and traumatic exposure should be treated differently due to their 
natures and their effect on the human body. 
If Ms. Edmonds' opinion is allowed to stand, she could have any carpal tunnel 
surgery, which ranges in cost up to $10,000, covered by her employer even if her 
employer was only 1 % responsible on a causative basis for her condition. If this were a 
case of traumatic injury, none of the conditions would be covered as the Commission 
would have to find the underlying condition was more likely than not exacerbated by the 
traumatic industrial injury. 
The legislature recognized this dichotomy between injuries and the fundamental 
differences in the types of injuries by allowing apportionment between industrial and 
non-industrial factors for injuries. Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-110. Similarly, the 
Legislature has already allowed the split of benefits between employers on a percentage 
basis. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105. This Court, as a result, should allow the 
apportionment of medical benefits as it is already allowed pursuant to statute. If the 
Court does not allow apportionment, the petitioner will have been allowed to shift the 
entirety of her non-industrial/pre-existing burden onto the employer. 
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In the alternative, the Court should adopt the reasoning of Giesbrecht to determine 
whether the industrial conditions substantially caused the need for surgery. If this principal is 
applied to the instant case, benefits must be denied as the Commission found that only 10% of 
Ms. Edmonds' condition was related to industrial factors. This solution would allow for equal 
application of the law between Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Ameritech, however, believes that 
apportionment is allowed and consistent with the nature of the injury. Given the differing nature 
of the injuries related to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, Ameritech believes that apportionment of 
medical expenses would not violate Ms. Edmonds5 equal protection rights. 
In sum, employers should be allowed to apportion medical benefits in 
occupational disease cases pursuant to the language in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110, 
which already is allowed in 34A-3-105. In the alternative, this Court should apply the 
test in Giesbrecht, or similar test, if it rules that apportionment is not permissible with medical 
benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritech respectfully request this Court overturn the 
Labor Commission Order On Motion for Review and allow Ameritech to apportion its 
liability for Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits based upon its percentage of liability. In the 
alternative, this Court should reconcile the case law regarding industrial accidents to case 
law regarding occupational disease claims. This would avoid the inconsistent outcome of 
an employer paying for 100% of the industrial and non-industrial medical benefits when 
the employer is found only to be 10% at fault. 
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